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simba2 - code a language
simbua – decode a language.
msimbo1 - 1 nickname/pseudonym. 2
code/cipher. 3. (computing) source code
msimbo
fiche – encrypted
code
It
is often cited that Chinese diplomats, in a move that puts off and baffles
European diplomats, describe themselves as coming from a developing country and
hence they don’t have a foreign policy. This is despite China having physical
superiority in many sectors over the developed countries with established
foreign policies. Consequently, it is often seen that Chinese international
relations deal with the world “as it is” as opposed to what they think “it
ought to be”. Majority of the countries in the world do the same thing of
dealing with the world “as it is” rather than making themselves “a centre of
orbit” and trying to recreate the world to what they think “it ought to be”
mainly because they aren’t at the centre of power because these are factors of power
relations rather than correctness. The idea of recreating the world as the only
means of knowing it and dealing with it stems from the concept of “exceptionalism”
with its various names like “manifest destiny” and “lebensraum”, and these have
their roots in the Kantian transcendental philosophy that overturned inquiry to
make the human mind the main subject of inquiry to understand reality rather
than the objects themselves that are found in reality.
The
Kantian idea of creation by man as a means to knowledge has many examples
including the creation and naming(coding) of dominions such as colonies, provinces
and protectorates. The entities that place themselves in this Kantian position
therefore expend anything possible to maintain this framework because they see
it as the only means to maintain knowledge and control. An example is the vehement
insistence by Harold Wilson, who was British Prime minister during the genocide
of Biafrans that millions of Biafrans killed would not change British foreign
policy on Nigeria if that’s what it took.
As
seen in part 2 of this series, the pseudonym ‘Frumentius’ used by the famous Half
Greek/Half Arab agent of Rome in Abyssinia, was useful for Roman empire (as
insiders) at that time and continues to be so to present successors of the
Roman polities. It helps in deriving meaning, purpose and chronological
mapping. It enables one to gain some insight, though often insufficient, into
the relationships of people, places and events with important milestone markers
and to key contextual factors (e.g., social, economic, political, demographic,
and cultural events and trends). This supports thinking, decisions, and
practice.
This
form of mapping from coding can be categorized into three forms, namely:
contexts, connections, and patterns.
(1)
Context
•
Understand an issue’s landscape/context and history.
•
Identify how contextual factors influence a topic/goal.
•
Put a group’s progress/challenges in context (e.g., relative to external
factors, key activities, and funding levels).
(2)
Connections
•
Explore the relationship between the group’s activities or achievements and
other actors’ activities or achievements.
(3)
Patterns
•
Determine where the energy is in the system and where there are gaps or
blockages.
•
Understand the group’s role or focus and how this has shifted over time.
•
Explore how the focus of other actors (or the larger system in general) has
shifted over time.
•
Visualize momentum, traction, and trends over time.
•
Understand how policies, structure, or social and cultural norms are changing.
•
Understand the relationship between outputs/outcomes and external events.
These
deductions constitute the framework of policy.
Policy is a deliberate system of guidelines to guide decisions and
achieve rational outcomes. This means that there has to be a set of values
developed as premises, from which actions can be rationally deduced. This
enables actions to be free from moral considerations and irregularity, notwithstanding
the character of the persons in power. Therefore, the actions become amoral and
reproducible regardless of circumstances.
Contemporary
foundations of ‘foreign policy’
Immanuel
Kant in his Critique of Pure Reason (1787 edition) drew a parallel between the
"Copernican revolution" and the epistemology of his new
transcendental philosophy. In essence, he turned the metaphysics of philosophy
upside down, that is, from the use of the senses to perceive phenomena and the
consequent categorization of objects into classes in a mental conceptual
process, to the proposition that categories (concepts) are inborn and prior and
determine what the senses perceive. This is an extreme proposition taken in
counter-position to the opposite extreme position that human beings are born ‘tabula
rasa’ and thus cumulatively fill their minds with new information like a
computer database. Both of these extremities are obviously unrecognizable to
any introspection or extrospection of humanness.
Kant's
comparison to the Copernican revolution is made in the Preface to the second
edition of the Critique of Pure Reason (published in 1787; a heavy revision of
the first edition of 1781). Kant argues that, just as Copernicus moved from the
supposition of heavenly bodies revolving around a stationary spectator to a
moving spectator, so metaphysics, "proceeding precisely on the lines of
Copernicus' primary hypothesis", should move from assuming that
"knowledge must conform to objects" to the supposition that
"objects must conform to our [a priori] knowledge". Quote from the
preface is as follows:
"Hitherto
it has been assumed that all our knowledge must conform to objects. But all
attempts to extend our knowledge of objects by establishing something in regard
to them a priori, by means of concepts, have, on this assumption, ended in
failure. We must therefore make trial whether we may not have more success in
the tasks of metaphysics, if we suppose that objects must conform to our
knowledge. This would agree better with what is desired, namely, that it should
be possible to have knowledge of objects a priori, determining something in
regard to them prior to their being given. We should then be proceeding
precisely on the lines of Copernicus' primary hypothesis. Failing of
satisfactory progress in explaining the movements of the heavenly bodies on the
supposition that they all revolved round the spectator, he tried whether he
might not have better success if he made the spectator to revolve and the stars
to remain at rest. A similar experiment can be tried in metaphysics, as regards
the intuition of objects."
Immanuel
Kant (1929) [1787]. "Preface". Critique of Pure Reason. Translated by
Norman Kemp Smith. Palgrave Macmillan.
Much
has been said on what Kant meant by referring to his philosophy as
"proceeding precisely on the lines of Copernicus' primary
hypothesis". There has been a long-standing discussion on the
appropriateness of Kant's analogy. According to Victor Cousin:
"Copernicus,
seeing it was impossible to explain the motion of the heavenly bodies on the
supposition that these bodies moved around the earth considered as an immovable
centre, adopted the alternative, of supposing all to move round the sun. So Kant,
instead of supposing man to move around objects, supposed on the contrary, that
he himself was the centre, and that all moved round him."
Victor Cousin
(1854), The Philosophy of Kant. London: John Chapman, p. 21
Copernicus
had good reason to overturn the perspective from having astronomical objects,
especially the sun, moving around a stationary earth, to that of the earth
moving around the sun and consequently, as done by other astronomers, isolating
other astronomical objects to determine what moves around what with provable
calculations rather than having a theory based on unprovable dogma. For Kant,
there wasn’t any good reason to repudiate the sensible inquiry that proceeds
from perception and consequent conceptualization, of which there’s constant
feedback between the two processes. Furthermore, it’s currently impossible to
sufficiently prove that human beings are born with prior concepts, what they
are, and how fundamental they are to sense perception. The comparison therefore
gives the impression of far fetching and inappropriateness.
References & further
reading
Immanuel Kant (1929) [1787].
Critique of Pure Reason. Translated by Norman Kemp Smith. Palgrave Macmillan.
TUKI (2001), Kamusi Ya
Kiswahili-Kiingereza; Swahili-English Dictionary. Published by Taasisi ya
Uchunguzi wa Kiswahili (TUKI), Chuo Kikuu cha Dar es Salaam, Tanzania.
Victor Cousin (1854), The
Philosophy of Kant. London: John Chapman
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